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We use a proprietary data set on the floor-level operations at the Bhilai Rail and Structural 
Mill (RSM) in India to understand how output rose sharply in response to competitive 
pressures. Output increases came predominantly from reductions in production delays of 
various kinds. We model interruptions to the production process as a function of worker 
characteristics and training and find that a large part of the avoidable delay reductions are 
attributable to a particular form of training, suggesting that such investments can have very 
high returns. Our work suggests very high returns to knowledge-enhancing investments in 
emerging economies. 
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Productivity dierences have been found to be important in explaining dierences in income.
Hall and Jones (1999) nd that of the 35-fold dierence in output per worker between the
United States and Niger, Total Factor Productivity (TFP) dierences explain about twice
as much as dierences in physical and human capital. Syverson (2004) estimates within-
industry TFP distributions in the United States and nds that rms in the 90th percentile
are twice as productive as those in the 10th percentile. Ratios for emerging economies appear
to be even larger. Based on plant level data from India and China, Hsieh and Klenow (2009)
argue that a reallocation of resources that would bring the dispersion of productivity down
to U.S. levels could raise output by as much as 50%.
Much of the literature treats productivity as a black box and evaluates its response to policy
through its correlation with a handful of observed variables, more recent work tries to go
deeper, though in narrower settings. These studies have been labeled \insider econometrics"
since they rely either on data generated inside plants and rms as part of their normal pro-
duction activities or on surveys with managers Shaw (2009) and such data is usually only
available to \insiders". These are often 
oor-level data on details of production process and
work practices that allow researchers to zoom in on the micro determinants of productivity.
This \bottom-up" approach has been at the frontier of research in both economics and man-
agement and has emphasized the role of contractual and organizational factors in explaining
productivity.
Our paper is very much a part of this emerging literature. We use data from over 3,000
production shifts in the Rail and Structural Mill at the Bhilai Steel Plant in Central India.
The mill has historically supplied all rails used by the Indian Railways and there was an
implicit agreement with the state that this would continue unless the rails were found to be
of substandard quality or the plant was unable to meet orders. Both of these factors led to
the threat of entry of private players in the 1990s. A series of railway accidents brought rail
quality into question and it was also unclear whether the plant could increase production in
line with the plans for expanding the rail network.
The mill responded to these competitive pressures with a 28% increase in output between
the rst quarters of 2000 and 2003 in spite of no signicant changes in employment or
wage contracts and higher quality standards. The number of defects were cut in half and
avoidable interruptions to production went down by 43 percent. We attribute much of this
productivity surge to a brief and low cost episode of training. The use of detailed factory

oor and administrative data on inputs, outputs and personnel allow us to control for the
composition of the work teams, narrowly specied product types, unobservable worker xed
eects and the other episodes of training that occurred during this period.
Our work is closely related to that of Ichniowski, Shaw and Prennushi (1997) who use longi-
2tudinal data on productivity and human resource management practices for 36 steel nishing
lines across the United States and nd that innovative practices have a productivity pre-
mium. A major source of higher productivity in their case is also increased uptime. Bloom
and Van Reenen (2007) relate good management practices and productivity using detailed
data on rms in dierent industries and countries. On the specic role of training in im-
proving productivity, Das and Sengupta (2007) study steel-making in India and nd that
managers contribute to productivity only when trained. A recent randomized experiment
that provided consulting services to textile rms in India shows that the resulting improve-
ment in management practices reduced defects levels by over 50% and that many managers
were simply unaware of low cost changes that could raise productivity (Bloom et al. 2010,
2011).
Also related is the literature that examines the response of productivity to competition.
Galdon-Sanchez and Schmitz (2005) show that when competitive pressures mounted in the
market for iron ore in the early 1980s, countries with mines that were close to becoming non-
competitive increased eciency, while others did not. Schmitz (2005) suggests this eciency
increase came about from improved work practices. Holmes, Levine and Schmitz (2008)
model disruptions caused by technology shifts and argue that monopolies are less likely to
innovate because they are under less pressure to tolerate the production losses that occur
while the rm adjusts to new technology. Other studies on competition and productivity
includes Caves and Christensen (1980), Rodriguez and Rodrik (1999), Tybout and Corbo
(1991), Tybout and Westbrook (1991), Tre
er (2004) and Nickell (1996).
Given the literature discussed above, it is worth emphasizing what we believe to be our main
contributions. First, the factory 
oor data that we use, though restricted to a particular
plant, is more detailed than any used in previous work. The rolling of rails is a continuous
process with 3 shifts a day and our data allows us to capture this process in real-time. As
management in the mill struggled to increase productivity, a variety of training programs
were introduced and we can therefore compare their relative in
uence in a manner that
is dicult with other data sets. Second, we consider a public sector undertaking where
employment is secure. Such institutions are believed to be characterized by weak incentives
and soft budget constraints. Although workers and managers in our study experienced
no changes in marginal incentives for performance, perceived competition brought about
changes in output. Organized sector workers in poor countries typically earn premium wages
with very little monitoring. Our work suggests that competitive pressures may operate quite
eectively with public ownership and the case for privatization in emerging economies that
is so often made may need to be qualied. In fact, competition in these settings may play a
much more important role than in industries dominated by private rms precisely because
earnings are often above market wages and there is a gap between the actual and potential
productivity of workers. Finally, in modeling the production process in the mill, we provide
a methodological approach which is generalizable to other settings.
3The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background on the plant
and an overview of the data. Section 3 estimates a reduced form model which supports our
hypothesis that the productivity surge is explained by employee training. This is a precursor
to the more structural approach in Section 4 which explicitly models the production process,
ts the model to our data, and runs some counterfactual experiments to help identify the
role of major contributors to productivity. Section 5 summarizes the lessons learned and
concludes.
2 The Background and Data
2.1 The Bhilai Rail and Structural Mill
The Rail and Structural Mill in Bhilai is a part of a large integrated steel plant owned by
the Steel Authority of India and built with Soviet cooperation in the 1950s. The location of
the plant was part of the state planning strategy to bring jobs to remote areas and the plant
successfully transformed Bhilai and ninety six of its surrounding villages into a company
town. Local residents were given preference in employment. The jobs of regular workers are
secure, with excellent fringe benets including schooling, health care, housing and paid leave.
There is a strong correlation between seniority and pay and a very weak one between pay and
performance.1These jobs have always been highly valued and workers here, in comparison
with other industrial workers in India, have been referred to as the aristocracy of labor Parry
(1999).
The Rail and Structural Mill ( RSM) was commissioned in 1960 and has since then been the
sole supplier of rails for Indian Railways. In addition to producing rails, the mill produces a
variety of dierent products (beams, channels, angles) that are collectively called structurals
and are either used directly in major infrastructural projects or as intermediate inputs in
industries producing heavy machinery. The production technology in the mill is outlined in
detail in Appendix A. In a nutshell, blocks of steel called blooms are fed into the furnace,
rolled into rails or structurals, and then cut and moved to the cooling bed.
Each shift at the plant is generally devoted to either rails or structurals of a particular
specication since switching between products results requires adjustments to the machinery
and some downtime. Production takes place continuously in three eight-hour shifts. A total
of 330 workers are employed at the mill during the period we study. Each worker can be
1In spite of this, Bhilai is regarded as one of the more successful of the public sector undertakings. In
our own eld visits we found groups of extremely committed workers operating under physical conditions,
particularly in the summer when 
oor temperatures can exceed 50 degrees centigrade in parts of the plant.
In addition, managers seem to put in long hours and pitch in where needed.
4tracked through a unique personal number that they are alloted when they join the plant.
In addition, each worker is assigned to a brigade or work team.
As mentioned above, the mill has historically been the sole supplier of rails to the Indian
Railways and there exists an informal understanding that this will continue unless the plant
at Bhilai fails to provide needed quantities of rails of appropriate quality. Over the period
we consider, the plant's orders were threatened for several reasons. First, a series of train
accidents, culminating in a major train wreck in 1998 that killed 210 people, led to investiga-
tions that found sub-standard rails to be a major cause. Consequently, the railways decided
to procure longer rails (reducing the number of joins) and limit their hydrogen content (since
excess hydrogen makes rails brittle and prone to fracture). Second, track replacements and
an expansion in the network led to an accelerated demand for rails and it was suggested that
procurement from private players and imports be allowed to supplement the capacity at
the Bhilai RSM. Finally, industrial liberalization measures of the early nineties had already
brought private capital into mid-sized steel plants and these rms were keen to diversify
into larger high-value products, like rails, with a stable demand. Executives and workers
understood that in the absence of signicant quantity and quality improvements, the market
share of the mill was severely threatened.2 In this setting, the RSM faced not just compe-
tition, but a threat to its very existence. A productivity surge ensued. How was this surge
obtained? What lessons can be drawn from their experience? These are our main questions.
2.2 Our Data
There are a total of 3,558 shifts covering the period of January 1, 2000 to March 31, 2003.
The core of our data set comes from two types of logs kept by the plant for each shift. The
rst of these is a delay report which records the total input of steel (number of blooms), total
output (non-defective blooms rolled), the share of defective blooms and the length and cause
of each interruption or delay in the production process. It also lists the brigade of workers
on the 
oor during the shift. The second log is called the daily presentee report (DPR) and
this records worker attendance by listing the personal numbers of all workers on the 
oor
during a shift. It also lists reasons for the absence of each worker in the brigade but not on
2Newspaper reports at the time frequently discussed the breaking of SAIL's monopoly on rails. The
Indian Express (June 9, 2000) reports:
Purchases from SAIL were stopped for a brief period of four months following the accident in
Khanna, when the quality of rail was questioned by the Railway Safety Committee. However,
purchases were later resumed in April 1999....
Jindal Steel and Power plans to break SAIL's hold over the huge orders by manufacturing rail
for the domestic market from the next year. The company will manufacture 78 metre long rail,
by acquiring and relocating a rail and structural mill in South Africa, near Raigarh in MP.
(\Railways to procure Rs 400 cr worth rails from Bhilai Steel" by Jyoti Mukul)
5the 
oor.
For active shifts, the delay report records and classies all delays into four types. Outside
delays, denoted by us as Do; occur due to events outside the control of the managers and
workers in the mill. These may be unanticipated, such as those caused by gas shortages or
electrical faults or anticipated but unavoidable as in the case of electricity rationing or an
inadequate supply of rail steel. Finishing delays, Df, result mostly from the cooling bed for
nished rails being full and unable to accept more rails. This is a downstream constraint
that can shut down or slow down production in the mill. Third are planned delays, Dp,
which are used for scheduled maintenance or adjustments of equipment. The fourth type
of delay is the most important one for our analysis; it consists of unplanned and avoidable
delays, Da that result from workers making mistakes. We argue in the following sections
that it was reductions in avoidable delays made possible notable productivity improvements
at the RSM. Although a description of the cause for each delay episode is available in the
data, we have no reference to the person or group at fault. We therefore model these delays
as a function of the characteristics of the entire team present during the shift.
We supplement the shift-level logs described above with administrative data on worker des-
ignations and demographics and all programs of formal training undertaken by employees of
the mill. In terms of designations, the technological process is organized around ten groups
of workers. Seven of them man the stations along the production line. The other three
groups (Executives, Crane operators and Technicians) participate at various stages of the
process. Since dierent groups perform dierent tasks, we treat them as separate types of
labor and construct ten labor variables from the shift-wise numbers in each of these groups.
It has been argued Parry (1999) that worker diversity by caste and residence may aect
cooperation among workers within a shift. We use two indices to capture dierent dimensions
of diversity:
Ilocal = min(Slocal;1   Slocal);
Icaste = min(Scaste;1   Scaste);
Slocal is the share of shift workers originating from the local area around Bhilai and Scaste
is the share of workers from the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. These are two
aggregate categories that comprise all the castes and tribes that have been declared as
disadvantaged by the Indian state and thereby eligible for armative action. Historically,
there was limited contact between these groups and the rest of the population. If there is
tension between these groups, mixed brigades may be less productive.
There was an emphasis on training programs at the plant following the dismal performance
of the company in the late nineties. Some training was also conducted because it helped
in obtaining International Organization for Standardization (ISO) certication. Although
there were a large number of programs, many of them lasted only a couple days and involved
6few employees. Training records include a brief description of each program, start and end
dates and a list of employees trained. We break up the total training time into the nine
categories listed in Table 1, based roughly on the types of skills being targeted. There were
four large programs which together account for two thirds of total training time over our
period. These are listed in Table 2.
By combining the dates of training and the employees trained with attendance data from
the DPR, we are able to generate training stocks for each shift in our data. So, for example,
the total stock of safety training for a worker at any date equals the total number of days
of such training administered to him by that date. We aggregate individual stocks of all
workers on the attendance sheet for that shift to construct our nine stocks for every shift.
The delay report from which we obtain output and delays data was only available to us in the
form of paper slips, one for each shift. Some of these were illegible and a few were missing.
In addition, some shifts were dropped because there were devoted entirely to maintenance.
These factors and some data cleaning (described in Appendix B) leave us with 3,121 shifts
or 88% of the 3,558 possible shifts in our period.
The summary statistics for our main variables are reported in Table 1. Average output
per shift increased by 46 blooms between the rst quarter of 2000 and 2003. The number of
defective blooms was halved and the number of interruptions caused by avoidable delays went
from 1.4 per shift to 0.8. Conditional on the occurrence of a delay, the minutes of downtime
did not change much. Employment over the period was fairly stable with approximately 66
workers on the 
oor in an average shift.3 The number of shifts devoted to rail production
went from 133 in the rst quarter of 2000 to 243 in the rst quarter of 2003. There was also
an overall increase in the number of shifts worked with fewer shutdowns. The bulk of the
training given was in the four categories listed in Table 2. The table also lists the name of
the most important training program in each category.
3 Reduced Form Estimates
We begin with reduced form estimates which reveal correlations between inputs and output
without forcing a particular production model on the data. These estimates are qualitatively
similar but larger than those in our preferred model in Section 4.4 They are useful in
3This is obtained by summing across the dierent designations. In total about 330 dierent workers were
employed by the RSM over this period. Turnover and days o account for the dierence in this number and
the number on the 
oor across three shifts.
4However, the reduced form says little about how productivity increases might have occurred. By mod-
eling production more carefully, we can better isolate the factors behind such improvements and reduce the
chances that we are picking up a spurious correlation in the reduced form. For this reason we estimate a
7Table 1: Summary statistics
Mean Std.dev. 2000 Q1 2003 Q1
Output, blooms 182 53 165 211
Defective output, blooms 1.7 1.7 2.6 1.3
Rolling rate, blooms/min 0.57 0.07 0.51 0.6
Delays per shift (# )
Avoidable 1.3 1.4 1.4 0.8
Finishing 0.22 0.43 0.07 0.1
Outside 0.76 0.92 0.86 0.51
Planned 1.85 1.2 1.8 2.1
Downtime per delay (min.)
Avoidable 30 39 30 29
Finishing 25 26 21 26
Outside 63 76 50 61
Planned 36 32 36 35
Workers (# )
Control Men 5.4 1.6 5.2 6
Coggers 4.8 1.2 4.3 4.4
Crane Operators 4.9 1.1 5.2 5.5
Executives 1.9 0.33 1.6 2.1
Furnace Maintenance 6.2 1.3 6.4 6
Ground Sta 19 2.2 19 20
SCM Team 12 2 12 12
Services 5.8 1.3 5.7 6
Saw Spell 4.7 1.3 5 4.4
Technicians 1.2 0.73 1.2 1
Training Stocks (days)
Productivity 63 54 0 110
Cost Reduction 24 11 19 33
Environmental 14 20 0 44
IT 6.5 4.8 1.7 11
Job Instruction 3.2 2.7 0 5.9
Motivational 21 34 3.6 119
Quality Control 19 19 4.2 42
Safety 20 9 7.5 29
Other 21 12 14 35
Diversity Indices
Backward vs. Other Castes 0.34 0.03 0.34 0.35
Locals vs Migrants 0.41 0.05 0.41 0.42
Shifts producing rails 2,609 133 243
Shifts producing structurals 512 92 16
8Table 2: The four biggest training programs of RSM employees, Jan 2000-March 2003
Name of program Dates Category % Training time
Acceptance of rails June 2001 { productivity 22
program { July 2001
ISO-9000 workshop May 2001, quality control 9
March 2002
ISO-14001 workshop Jan 2002, environmental 10
July 2002
Success through Oct 2002 { motivational 24
empowerment of people { Jan 2003
Source: Personnel Records, Rail and Structural Mill
establishing that our overall conclusions do not rely on our structural assumptions.
We estimate a shift-level output equation:
Ys = Xs + "s
where Ys refers to the blooms rolled during shift s and Xs is a vector of explanatory variables
for the shift.
The variables that comprise the shift-wise characteristics Xs in our model include the number
of workers disaggregated by their designation, diversity indices based on hometown and caste,
and training stocks by nine training categories. In every specication of our reduced form
model, we control for type of output being produced as heavier products are typically slower
to roll. We also control for the time of day, as morning shifts are usually less productive,
and for the brigade-specic xed unobservables.
Our results are reported in Table 3. The estimates of the baseline specication are shown in
the rst column. There are two training categories that are statistically signicant and have
positive coecients: productivity and motivational training. Safety training is marginally
signicant but with a negative sign. Surprisingly, the numbers of non-executive workers on
the 
oor do not seem to be systematically correlated with output; they are at most marginally
signicant.5 Brigades where employees from dierent castes are mixed together do not seem
to do worse in terms of productivity than more homogeneous brigades. Brigades where
locals work together with migrants appear to be slightly less productive, consistent with the
anecdotal stories from Parry (1999), but the relationship is not statistically signicant.
semi structural model of production in the next section.
5This number may be endogenous and we address this issue using an instrumental variable strategy
described towards the end of this section.
9In Columns 2 and 3 we attempt to isolate the eects of unobservables that could create an
upward trend in output. By construction, training stocks are weakly increasing, and for
this reason may be spuriously correlated with the observed growth of output. Most training
programs are administered to groups of workers so the stocks of training in work teams
change sharply over time. If the trend in unobservables varies smoothly, its spurious eect
on the training coecients should be greatly reduced with the introduction of quarter xed
eects in Column 2 and quarter-brigade xed eects in Column 3. However, the estimated
eects of both productivity and motivational training stocks remain the same, although the
latter estimate becomes less precise consistent with motivational training spuriously entering
the regression. The estimates also suggest that, among the dierent employee designations,
only the number of executive workers on the 
oor is consistently associated with a higher
output per shift.
In Table 3 we also report the p-values of the F-test that labor (of all designations) collectively
makes no contribution to output. We nd that even with the inclusion of executive workers,
this test statistic is only marginally signicant. Similarly we test for whether all training
other than productivity training matters: in our preferred specication (Column 3) it does.
We suspect that motivational training drives this result and we revisit this question at the
the end of this section.
To examine the eect of productivity training more closely, we take a dierence-in-dierences
approach. We use the fact that productivity training was focused primarily on rails, as
opposed to structurals; in fact, the training episode that accounted for a bulk of productivity
training was termed the \acceptance of rails program". Any worker-level unobservables such
as the level of motivation or cooperation on the 
oor are likely to aect both rail and
structural shifts6. Rails and structurals follow the same technological path in the production
process, hence any unobserved improvements in the quality of physical capital are likely to
improve output of both types of products as well. For these reasons, if one wishes to measure
the eect of productivity training, structural shifts would be a good control for rail shifts.
We therefore add the interaction of a rail shift dummy and stock of productivity training to
our regression, thereby allowing productivity training to have a dierent eect on rails and
structurals.
The results of this exercise are reported in Column 4 and conrm that the eect of such train-
ing is coming from rails and not structurals and that the size of the eect is approximately
the same as in specications (1)-(3). Figure 1 depicts this result in a more informal way by
plotting the average output of rail and structural shifts and indicating the time period when
most of the productivity training took place. The increase in rail output and the absence of
such an increase in structurals is evident.7
6Rails and structurals are produced by the same brigades of workers; there are no \specialist" brigades.
7In Figure 1 we control for the type of structurals produced in order to eliminate any eects due to
changes in the composition of structurals as these are very diverse. This is done by rst estimating an OLS
regression of blooms rolled on indicator variables for each product (whether rails or structurals). Recall that
10Table 3: Output equation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Workers (# )
Control men -0.95 -0.89 -0.95 -0.97 -0.83 0.24
Coggers -1.14 -0.87 -2.08 -2.07 -1.67 -0.60
Crane Operators -1.86 -1.60 -1.30 -1.26 -0.94 -1.96
Executives 6.94 7.47 6.75 6.72 6.74 6.52
Furnace Maintenance 1.39 1.44 1.73 1.77 1.25 2.70
Ground Sta -0.41 -0.18 -0.44 -0.39 -0.86 -0.50
SCM Team -0.24 0.03 0.27 0.26 0.43 1.53
Services 0.16 0.02 0.28 0.11 0.28 -0.88
Saw Spell -0.99 -1.17 -0.89 -0.85 -0.58 -0.22
Technicians 0.17 0.59 0.59 0.38 0.29 -0.43
Training Stocks (days)
Productivity training 0.27 0.28 0.34 0.09 0.31 0.28
Productivity X Rail Shift 0.29
Cost Reduction 0.08 0.08 0.60 0.57 0.44 0.50
Environmental -0.07 -0.25 -0.63 -0.71 -0.60 -0.72
IT -0.44 -0.41 -0.23 -0.26 -0.25 -0.12
Job Instruction 0.19 -0.06 -0.52 -0.40 -0.46 -0.46
Motivational 0.21 0.23 0.27 0.26 0.18 0.28
Quality Control 0.20 0.18 0.39 0.38 0.26 0.36
Safety -0.45 -0.45 -0.68 -0.57 -0.38 -0.71
Other 0.07 0.10 -0.19 -0.21 -0.21 -0.19
Diversity Indices
Backward vs. Other Castes 43 40 46 48 67 51
Locals vs Migrants -52 -52 -59 -52 -49 -54
Joint Tests, p-values
Labor=0 0.04 0.09 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.08
Non-prod. training=0 0.00 0.15 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.01
Quarter xed eect No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Brigade X Quarter FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,121 3,121 3,121 3,121 3,121 3,121
Signicance levels  5%  1%
Unreported controls: Brigade, product, time of day xed eects
Columns 1-4: OLS; dependent variable { blooms rolled (per shift)
Column 5: OLS; dependent variable { (blooms rolled/rolling rate)(average rolling rate)
Column 6: IV; dependent variable { blooms rolled; endogenous variables: non-executive
labor; instruments: extraordinary absence, interactions of all xed eects
11Under this specication, an extra day's productivity training for the brigade raises the output
by 0.29 blooms per shift. During the episode in which productivity training was concentrated
(June-July 2001), an average worker received 1.6 days of training. As there are roughly 66
workers on the 
oor in a rail shift, a total stock of training grew by 106 days for an average
working brigade. This translates into an output increase of 31 blooms per shift. Comparing
this number to the actual increase in output of rails that took place during the summer of
2001 (see Figure 1), one can easily see that the productivity training played a major role in
the rapid growth of the rail output.
As it happened, this training episode took place when the plant was shut down for mainte-
nance and machinery replacement thereby eectively reducing the opportunity cost of the
work time lost to training to zero. However, even stopping the mill for the duration of this
training program would result in negligible costs relative to the productivity gains. The
amount of training administered could be completed in two days (i.e. six shifts), leading to
approximately 160  6 = 960 blooms in forfeited output. Given the productivity improve-
ment of 31 blooms per shift, it would take only 31 shifts (i.e. less than two weeks) for this
investment of time to pay o. We do not have gures for any other costs associated with
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Figure 1: Eect of productivity training on output per shift (adjusted for product type)
While the eect of productivity training was large and systematic in all our specications,
we did not nd similar evidence on the role of motivational training. Motivational training
programs commenced on October 3rd, 2002, and were administered very gradually. For this
we dropped all shifts with mixed products (dierent types of rails or dierent types of structurals or mixed
rails and structurals). For each shift we then adjust the output mix by subtracting the xed eect of the
product actually produced in the shift and adding the xed eect of the base product. The adjusted output
is then plotted in gure 1.
12reason, we could not rely on a sharp increase in output to identify the eect of motivational
training, as we did for productivity training.
Moreover, on September 4th, 2002, one month before the rst person was trained, there
was a systematic increase in the rate of production dened by the rolling rate, as depicted
in Figure 2. This increase in the blooms rolled per minute of uptime coincided with the
installation of new equipment which appears to have increased rolling rates.8 To ensure
that our estimates are not confounded by the higher rolling rates associated with the new
equipment, we estimate a model in which rolling rates are forced to be equal across shifts.
This focuses on the output eects of production uptime. We do this by dividing output
per shift by the rolling rate for the shift and multiplying by the average rolling rate in the
entire data. We then re-estimate the same equation as in Column 3 and report the results in
Column 5 of Table 3. Motivational training is no longer statistically signicant and its size
falls by about a third compared to that in Column 3. In contrast, the size of the coecient
on productivity training remains roughly the same. This also suggests that productivity
training worked mainly through increases in uptime rather than by increasing the number
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Figure 2: Coincidence of motivational training and investment into new equipment
Our nal specication addresses the issue of labor endogeneity. If managers expect break-
downs, they may ask employees to work overtime or postpone earned leave. As a result,
the estimated eect of labor would be biased downwards and may even become negative.
We explore this possibility by using worker absence as an instrument for labor. Every time
8We identify this using delay cause descriptions. On exactly September 4th a new delay cause started
appearing in the data; it is listed as \jamming at new descaling unit". Since the increase in the rolling
rate occurred simultaneously with the installation of the new equipment, we conclude that the former was
likely to be caused by the latter. Our treatment of the rolling rate as rigidly determined by the technical
parameters of the mill is in line with Ichniowski, Shaw and Prennushi (1997) who study a very similar
production process.
13an employee does not show up on the 
oor with his brigade, the reason for his absence is
recorded. Usually, the absence is predictable and is controlled by the management to some
degree: a worker may have a regular day-o, be on a holiday, or on an earned leave. How-
ever, there are instances when workers skip shifts due to a medical emergency, an injury
at work, or some other extraordinary event. The total number of employees of each kind
who do not show up at work at a given shift for those unusual reasons is clearly a good
instrument for labor. Thus, we construct the number of workers predicted to be on the 
oor
for that brigade, in that quarter and time of day of the shift, given the number of workers
taking extraordinary leave. We use this instrument to estimate the same equation as in (3)
and report our results in column 6. The two sets of results are similar suggesting that such
endogeneity is not a major issue.9
Before proceeding to a more structural model, it is worth summarizing the consistent patterns
that emerge from our reduced form approach. Table 3 suggests that there is at best a
weak link between labor and output. With the exception of executive workers, the number
of workers on the 
oor is not consistently associated with higher output. One possible
explanation of this result is that the RSM is overstaed, which is in line with popular beliefs
about public sector enterprises in India. We do not nd any support for the number of
workers being endogenous. Diversity indices seem to have little systematic eect on output
in our data. Training seems to matter: in particular, productivity training through a program
designed to increase the output of acceptable rails has large and durable eects.
4 A Semi Structural Model of Production
The reduced form specication in the previous section suggests that productivity training
might be responsible for most of the improvement in output per shift. However, it says
little about how such an improvement might have occurred. If the improvement occurred
through the operation of factors potentially subject to control like avoidable delays, then
the evidence is consistent with our story. However, if, for example, outside delays fell in the
period of productivity training, we could mistakenly identify productivity training as being
behind the increases in output per shift. For this reason we estimate a semi structural model
of production that allows us to rule this out.
9We do not have data on the reason for absences for executives and are therefore unable to construct a
separate instrument for them. Their numbers are treated as exogenous.
144.1 The Production Process
We model a stylized version of the production process in which each bloom goes through
a sequence of dierent stages before being nished. At each stage, either events outside
the control of the brigade may occur or workers on the 
oor may make mistakes. These
events and mistakes result in delays. The duration of most delays are allowed to depend
on the worker characteristics during the shift. We choose what we believe are reasonable
distributions for delay times caused by these events and then estimate the parameters of
these distributions. We denote events and mistakes by Mx, their probability of occurrence
by Px and delay times by Dx, where x 2 fo;p;a;fg refers to the type of delay (outside,
planned, avoidable and nishing).
The stages of production are as follows:
1. A steel bloom is fed into the furnace area for reheating.
2. An outside event may occur at this point triggering an outside delay of Do minutes.
3. Next, workers may make an avoidable mistake causing an avoidable delay of Da minutes
before production is restored.
4. To roll the bloom into a nal product, it takes time t where t = 1=R and R is the
rolling rate which may vary by quarter.
5. When the bloom is rolled, there is some chance of the cooling bed being full, resulting
in a nishing delay of Df minutes.
6. With probability p the nal product is non-defective.
7. With some probability the equipment requires maintenance and Dp minutes are spent
in a planned delay.
8. The process is repeated starting from step 1.
In the case of outside, planned and nishing delays, the events causing these delays are
usually beyond the control of the mill workers. These include poor quality steel, 
ooding,
electricity shortages, voltage 
uctuations or a full cooling bed. We assume these delays occur
with some exogenous probability that we allow to vary by the calendar quarter during which
production takes place. We use a logit model to approximate the probability that each of
these delays will occur. For calendar quarter q
Px(q) = PrfMx = 1jqg =
1
1 + e xq
15where x 2 (o;p;f):
Avoidable delays, in contrast, are caused by worker negligence and their occurrence depends
on worker characteristics. For a shift with worker characteristics X , the probability of
avoidable mistakes is assumed to be given by




Once a delay occurs, worker characteristics often in
uence how quickly the underlying prob-
lem is resolved. For example, 
ooding in the rainy season requires drainage of the aected
area before production can be resumed and 
uctuations in electrical voltage or broken equip-
ment may have to be reported. When rails are defective or machinery is jammed, workers are
actively involved in clearing the work area and equipment. This is true for all but nishing
delays which occur downstream and do not involve mill personnel. We therefore allow delay
durations for all but nishing delays to depend on shift characteristics.
If a delay of type x occurs, its duration, Dx, is a drawn from a gamma distribution  (
xX;x),
where the shape parameter is dependent on shift characteristics X and the scale parameter,
x, is constant for a given delay type. For x 2 fo;p;ag, the density function for delay
durations is therefore













; x = a;o;p:
For nishing delays Ff(Df) takes a similar gamma form with the shape parameter indepen-
dent of X but varying by quarter:











We chose the gamma distribution because of its 
exibility and nd that it ts the data quite
well. It also has a convenient invariance property allowing for a simple interpretation of the
estimates. Assume the observed delay durations come from the sum of some baseline delays
caused by each individual on the 
oor and that these individually generated delays are inde-
pendently generated. Then if the delays of a single worker come from the gamma distribution
 (i;) where i is worker i's propensity to generate delays, by gamma-additivity, total de-
lays are distributed as  (ii;). Our formulation is therefore consistent with, though not
restricted to, a model in which delays are the sum of delays caused by individual workers
and individual delays in turn depend on the characteristics of the worker, the product and
the brigade.
16To keep our estimation simple, we assume all random processes (Mx, Dx) are jointly in-
dependent conditional on covariates X. The only permissible correlation between outside,
avoidable and planned delays must therefore go through the observed characteristics of the
brigade on the 
oor. This allows us to estimate avoidable, outside and planned delays in-
dependently of each other. We estimate 
x and x by applying the method of maximum
likelihood to the sub-sample of blooms with positive delay durations, Dx
10.
It is worth emphasizing that if the probability of outside delays coincidentally fell just when
productivity training was given, this would be picked up by the quarterly dummies in the
model and would not spuriously be attributed to productivity training.
4.2 Results
The model is estimated on the sample of 2,609 shifts producing only rails during the period




p. To facilitate the interpretation of the results, we rescaled the estimates so that they
represent the marginal eects of the components of X on output. Thus the coecient on
productivity training of :06 in Column 1 means that an extra day of such training reduces
the probability of avoidable delays in a way that results in :06 additional blooms rolled per
shift. Appendix C describes the derivation of these marginal eects.
Column 1 of the table contains logit estimates of the determinants of delay episodes. If an
avoidable delay occurs during a shift, we set Ma = 1 for the rst bloom in that shift. For each
subsequent avoidable delay on that shift, we assign that delay to subsequent blooms in that
same shift. If, say, four avoidable delay episodes occur during that shift, Ma = 1 for the rst
four blooms of that shift. Given that the worker characteristics are the same for all blooms
rolled in the shift and delays are assumed to be independent, all assignments of delays to
blooms have equal probability and the way in which delays are assigned to particular blooms
does not aect our estimates. The number of observations is the total number of blooms
rolled into rails during the period.
The next three columns contain maximum likelihood estimates based on the gamma distri-
butions described above and the number of observations is therefore the number of all delay
episodes during this period for each type of delay. The dependent variable is the amount of
delay time, in minutes. There are therefore as many observations per shift as delay episodes
of the category that is being explained.
10This likelihood function has been shown to be concave and therefore has a unique maximum Choi and
Wette (1969).
11We exclude structurals to ensure maximum product homogeneity. The number of rail and structural
shifts is given in Table 1
17Total labor variables alone might not be able to capture all the relevant dynamics in workforce
composition. When using aggregate numbers for dierent designations and training stocks,
we implicitly assume that replacing one worker with another will not change the outcome as
long as the workers' training stocks, etc., are the same. If this is not the case, our estimates
may be subject to the omitted variable bias. To check the robustness of the estimates in
Table 5 we augment X by individual worker dummies and reestimate these equations.
The estimates presented in Tables 4 and 5 conrm the main result from the previous section:
productivity training signicantly increases output mainly through decreases in the occur-
rence of avoidable delays. The total eect of an additional day of productivity training for
a work shift can be obtained by summing the coecients of productivity training across the
columns in Table 5). This gives us 0.14 blooms per day of training which is less than half
the size of the reduced form coecient of 0.29 blooms reported in Table 3. This translates
into an output increase of 14.84 blooms per shift as opposed to the 31 blooms obtained from
reduced form estimates. This comparison suggests that while the reduced form estimates
do pick up some spurious correlation between output and the training received by the work-
ers, the direct eect of productivity training on the probability of avoidable delays remains
signicant in a more controlled analysis.12
Our estimates in this section do not support the hypothesis of a positive eect of motivational
training. The total eect of motivational training here is an order of magnitude lower than
the corresponding estimates in the reduced form section. In addition, after the brigade
composition is fully controlled by the inclusion of worker dummies, the eect of motivational
training on any component of downtime becomes statistically insignicant. This supports our
interpretation from the previous section: the positive estimates of the motivational training
eect in Table 3 seem to pick up a coincidental shock to productivity caused by outside
factors.
As in the previous section, the link between the number of workers on the 
oor and the level
of output is insignicant. There is no evidence that larger teams make fewer mistakes or x
these mistakes faster. This lack of statistical signicance persists even after controlling for
the identities of workers and further supports the anecdotal evidence on overstang at the
Bhilai Steel Plant given in Parry (1999). We also nd no evidence that diversity impairs
productivity; if anything, workers in shifts that are heterogeneous in terms of caste seem to
make fewer mistakes.
Productivity training seems to be the only explanatory variable that is positively associated
with higher output irrespective of the model's specication. To quantify and better illustrate
the total eect of such training on output, we perform a set of counterfactual simulations
below where the stocks of such training and other possibly relevant explanatory variables
12This may be because the reduced form does not fully pick up shift-wise factors outside the workers'
control such as power outages or the quality or steel.
18Table 4: Estimates of downtime components
Ma Da Do Dp
Workers (#)
Control Men -0.25 0.11 0.15 -0.29
Coggers 0.38 -0.04 -0.19 -0.31
Crane operators 0.26 -0.15 -0.88 0.24
Executives 0.97 -0.01 -0.59 0.62
Furnace Maintenance 0.05 0.04 0.55 0.17
Ground Sta -0.25 -0.11 -0.10 0.05
SCM Team -0.33 0.17 0.25 0.12
Services -0.19 -0.05 0.24 0.11
Saw Spell 0.02 -0.00 0.32 0.09
Technicians -0.94 -0.04 -0.43 -0.44
Training Stocks (days)
Productivity 0.06 0.00 0.02 0.01
Cost Reduction -0.15 -0.02 0.03 0.04
Environmental 0.11 -0.02 0.03 0.05
IT -0.02 0.02 -0.07 -0.03
Job Instruction -0.36 0.06 0.37 -0.24
Motivational 0.03 -0.00 -0.01 0.01
Quality Control 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.01
Safety 0.07 -0.02 -0.31 -0.12
Other 0.11 0.01 -0.03 -0.04
Diversity Indices
Backward vs. Other Castes 21 1.2 2.7 13
Locals vs. Migrants -7.0 0.57 9.8 -6.9
Observations: 481,003 3,329 1,800 5,209
Signicance levels :  5 percent  1 percent
Unreported controls: Brigade, product, time of day xed eects
Only shifts producing rails are included.
Column 1: marginal eects on output via the probability of avoidable delays
Columns 2{4: marginal eects via the respective delay durations
19are varied and the dynamics of simulated output are compared with observed output.
4.3 Counterfactual Experiments
We now use our estimates from the above model to study the impact of counterfactual
changes in labor, diversity and the stock of training on the overall output. To avoid omitted
variable bias, we restrict ourselves to the specication with individual xed eects and use
the estimates from Table 5.
We simulate production bloom by bloom, following the multistep procedure outlined in the
beginning of this section. In each of our counterfactual experiments, the set of brigade char-
acteristics is split in two parts: X = [X1;X2]. In our simulations we freeze the components
of X1 at their level in the rst quarter of 2000. The components of X2 are allowed to change
over time as observed in the data. This way, we predict the time path of output that would
occur, had the management chosen not to adjust the variables in X1. By changing the
composition of X1 and X2 from one simulation to the next, we sequentially examine the
importance of dierent sets of explanatory variables.
If R is the quarterly rolling rate, each bloom that enters the mill takes time 1=R to be
processed if no mistakes or delays occur. If the model generates the event that a draw from
a delay distribution is warranted, then the delay drawn is added to this time. Many delays
may occur and these are additively incorporated. There is a probability, which varies by
calendar quarter, that the bloom may be defective or cobbled, in which case the simulation
will throw this bloom out. This continues until the 480 minutes of the shift are over. At
the end of each shift, the total blooms rolled are generated. We take the monthly output
generated by the simulation and label this to be the simulated output.
We start with simulating a full model in which X2 contains all the covariates and X1 is
empty. We then shrink the list of variables in X2 in stages and observe the response of
simulated output. The results of these experiments are depicted in Figure 3. In this gure,
we report an average output across one thousand simulations, as well as the condence
bounds that account for randomness in the process that generates downtime.
Panel (a) shows that the full model ts the monthly output data very well. Recall that so as
not to over parametrize the model, we only allow for quarterly changes in the probabilities
of outside, planned and nishing delays. As a result, if outside delays, for example, are
frequent in a particular week or month, the model will not take this into account and will
tend to overestimate output for that month. This is why the model does not track the data
spike by spike, but it does track it well on average.
In panel (b), we assume that the diversity indices are kept at their average level in the rst
20Table 5: Estimates of downtime components (with worker dummies)
Dependent variable Ma Da Do Dp
Workers ( # )
Control Men -1.24 2.28 1.02 -2.55
Coggers -0.00 2.56 -1.80 -1.92
Crane operators 2.51 0.89 -1.28 -2.90
Executives 0.39 -0.99 3.38 0.36
Furnace Maintenance -1.94 2.30 7.14 -0.71
Ground Sta -2.67 -0.04 4.63 1.31
SCM Team -1.09 2.54 1.70 -1.84
Services -5.37 -1.48 3.19 0.77
Saw Spell -2.27 -0.70 4.93 2.31
Technicians -1.18 1.28 -1.29 2.80
Training Stocks (days)
Productivity 0.08 0.01 0.03 0.02
Cost Reduction 0.11 -0.11 -0.10 0.26
Environmental -0.05 -0.03 0.05 0.07
IT 0.10 0.02 -0.73 -0.22
Job Instruction -1.20 -0.23 1.28 -0.53
Motivational 0.00 0.02 -0.00 0.04
Quality Control 0.02 0.05 0.06 0.03
Safety -0.04 -0.10 -0.27 -0.30
Other 0.09 -0.01 -0.01 -0.04
Diversity Indices
Backward vs. Other Castes 64 22 111 -38
Locals vs. Migrants -13 -0.43 1.5 -5.9
Observations: 481,003 3,329 1,800 5,209
Signicance levels :  5 percent  1 percent
Unreported controls: Worker, product, time of day xed eects
Only shifts producing rails are included.
Column 1: marginal eects on output via the probability of avoidable delays





















































































































































































































(e) Freeze all covariates: X2 = []
Figure 3: Diversity, labor and training, and their overall eects on output per shift
22quarter of 2000. By comparing simulated output here with that in panel (a), we see that
this restriction does very little to estimated output: therefore we can say that the eect of
changing diversity is very small.
In the next panel, we impose restrictions on an additional set of variables: the total labor
in each team and all worker dummies. This does not allow the management to control the
composition of the workforce at all. The 
uctuations in output are now driven only by
training stocks and the quarterly dummies. This causes a model to slightly underpredict
output starting early 2002. Since the data is not systematically outside the condence
bands of the predictions, we can say that changes in these labor related variables were not
the primary determinants of output growth. In the RSM, total labor used did not change
by much in this period and none of these coecients is signicant so it is not not surprising
that the change that did occur has little impact.
Panel (d) shows what output would be produced if no changes in diversity or labor com-
position were allowed and only the productivity training was administered to the workers.
This way, we shut down the eects of all training that does not belong to the productivity
category. There is some over-prediction in the rst and second quarter of 2001 in panel (d),
but the t is good in later periods.
Finally, in panel (e) we x all covariates at their level of their average value in the rst
quarter of 2001. The predicted time path of output is driven by the outside factors only,
i.e, variations captured by the quarterly dummies in the probability and duration of delays
and the quarterly variations in the processing rate. We see a large discrepancy between the
predictions. Eyeballing the last two panels we see that productivity training was crucial
in increasing output, with the total eect of the productivity training program equal to
approximately 20 blooms of additional output per shift.13 Had management done nothing
to train the employees, the growth in output would have been much more modest.
5 Conclusions
We see the contribution of this paper as both empirical and methodological. We attempt
to explain output growth at Bhilai Rail and Structural Mill, a unit of the state-owned
Steel Authority of India. In line with recent work in industrial organization we nd worker
training to be a low cost approach to improving productivity. Our analysis is based on a
proprietary dataset that documents 
oor-level operations in greater detail than available in
most studies within the productivity literature. This allows us to control for unobservable
worker characteristics, shift-wise changes in the composition of work teams and the eects
13Since output is a non linear function of training, the marginal eects need not be exactly the same as
those from the counterfactuals.
23of periodic maintenance of equipment or availability of inputs. The access to data on all
training programs allows us to isolate the types of training that have high returns. We
attribute output growth to training that is specically targeted to improving the output of
acceptable rails by reducing the likelihood of mistakes on the factory 
oor. Training that
is designed to achieve formal quality certication or improve safety and worker motivation
appears to have no systematic eects in our case. In line with Galdon-Sanchez and Schmitz
(2005) and Schmitz (2005), we suggest that competitive pressure was primary driver of
productivity improvements.
On the methodological side, we explicitly model the process of production. The model we
propose is not specic to the steel industry and could be applied to any manufacturing
process that is organized around tasks in an established technological chain. This structural





Figure 4 is a schematic representation of the production process. The main input is a long
rectangular block of steel called a bloom. These are stored in the bloom yard and passed
through dierent sections in a sequential process which converts them into rail tracks. They
rst enter one of four furnaces where they are reheated. They then move through a series of
work tables in the mill area where they are shaped. The shaped blooms are cut to ordered
lengths in the hot saw area and then stamped and moved to a cooling bed. Defective or mis-
shapen blooms are referred to as cobbled and are set aside, the rest are classied as rolled.
The mill runs twenty four hours a day, seven days a week with rare shutdowns for service
and repairs. Production workers are rotated among three eight-hour production shifts.
Each worker, at any point in time, has a designation based on their job description and
their seniority. Designations can be usefully divided into a few groups. Some workers are
restricted to a particular location in the production process while others move around and
ensure its smooth operation. In the furnace area, the services team keeps records of blooms,
control men move the blooms in and out of the furnace and the furnace maintenance team,
as the name suggests, ensures the furnace is in working order. In the mill area, ground sta
are on the 
oor of the mill to ensure production 
ows smoothly. The SCM team is a group
of senior control men and motor operators who along with the coggers sit in pulpits and
direct the actual rolling of the rails in this part of the plant. In the hot saw area we have
the saw spell team. Crane operators man cranes that transport blooms at various stages
24Figure 4: The process for rail production in the RSM
of production, technicians are responsible for xing mechanical problems in the machines,
while the executives oversee the operation as a whole. The model of production we estimate
in Section 4 uses shift-wise data on the numbers of workers in each of these categories. There
are shift-wise variations in these numbers generated by the number and types of workers on
leave during any particular shift.
Shifts are operated by groups of workers called brigades that remain relatively stable over
time. Each worker, at the time of joining the mill is assigned to one of these brigades. Brigade
membership can be changed based on worker preferences and decisions of the supervisory
and executive sta but these movements are infrequent. There are more people in a brigade
than typically work in a shift, allowing for weekly days o and other types of leave. Brigades
are rotated weekly across shifts: if a brigade works the morning shift in week one, it is
switched to work the afternoon shift for week two and and the night shift for week three.
6.2 Data Construction
There are a maximum of 3,558 shifts that cover the period of January 1, 2000 to March 31,
2003. Our data cleaning procedure drops 76 shifts with missing delay data and 126 shifts
with missing or zero output; the majority of these shifts occur during regular maintenance
days, when the entire mill is shut down. We also exclude 23 shifts with evident inconsistencies
in the data such as those with zero uptime and non-zero output, or abnormally high or low
25Table 6: Shifts in the main sample, by product type
Product # shifts Product # shifts
Rails: Structurals: Beams
R-52 1,428 B-250 89
R-60 1,149 B-300 82
BS-90 32 B-350 17
Structurals: Channels B-400 27
CH-250 54 B-450 26
CH-300 19 B-500 50
CH-400 40 B-600 108
rolling rates.
For each shift in the remaining sample we have a description of the type of output being
produced. All products fall into two broad categories: rails and heavy structurals. We
eliminate 212 shifts producing exotic products (such as crossing sleepers) or more than one
type of output. The remaining 3,121 shifts constitute our main sample and are listed in
Table 6 by product type.
6.3 Marginal Eects on Output per Shift
To facilitate the interpretation of the results obtained in the semi structural model of Section
4, it is useful to express all the estimates in terms of implied output gains. Let the expected
output per shift be Y = E[Y ]. Suppose that one is interested in the eect of productivity
training (denoted as Xpt). To derive the expression for this eect, one has to relate Y to the
model's parameters,  and 
. This is done as follows.
Let T be the time needed to roll one bloom, taking into account all delays that occur along
the way. This is a random variable; its distribution is determined by probabilities of delays
of each type and the respective distributions of downtime. Specically, the distribution of
T is fully determined by the model's parameters,  and 
, brigade characteristics, X, and
quarter, q.
Recall that Px is the probability of a delay of type x for a single bloom and Dx is the delay
time in minutes if the delay occurs. If R is the rolling rate for the quarter in question, then
the expected time required to role a bloom is the inverse of the rolling rate plus all expected
26delays for a single bloom. Denoting the expected value of T by T, we have













where p is the probability of a non defective bloom. After substituting the above expression
for T into the expression for  Y , and noting that p and R vary only by quarter and so are
unaected by X, one can derive the marginal eect of any component of X. In particular,































dXpt | {z }
column 4
where Dj = E[DjjMj = 1] where j 2 (a;f;o;p): The labels in the above equation refer to
columns in Tables 4 and 5. Note that as
dY (X)
dXpt is a function of X;we need to specify where
it is evaluated: the numbers reported in Tables 4 and 5 are the values of the components of
the function evaluated at the sample mean of X.
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